Libya: the challenges of an unfinished transition

ladies and gentlemen thank you so much for coming to join us this afternoon I am delighted to welcome you to the latest installment of the double i SS conflict briefings so these are a series of briefings that the conflicts and secure conflict security and development program has established and each month we zoom in on a different conflict we bring in our in-house analysts and our senior analysts to give you their insights both from both their regional expertise and also from their monitoring work on our armed conflict database and I am very happy that today we have to absolutely outstanding analysts to talk us through the conflict in Libya so to my immediate left is dr. Amato professor Umberto is stabilized ss is Libya analyst and he is also the maghreb analyst for the NATO Defense College Foundation and he specializes in political developments security and terrorism in Libya and in the Middle East and to his left we have so okay I'm WI SS is senior fellow at least security and he specializes in political and conflict analysis in the broader Middle East so I'm gonna begin by asking Umberto who briefed us on the key developments happening within Libya today and I'd be asking Emil to consider the wider regional influences that are going to affect Libya's conflict after about 30 minutes we're going to open the floor to Q&A and please be advised that this briefing is on the record and we are being live streamed by webinar without any further ado let's begin I'm bad so Libya's different political players are still struggling to exert over much of the country as we move through 2019 when I joined the army conflicts database in 2016 there were real hopes that the conflict in Libya was about to end the government of national unity was just arrived in Tripoli and after the climax which with the seizure of the city of Sirte the Islamic state terrorist organizations was about to to be defeated outside its core but there were structural factors that prevented this conflict to be to be resolved the main issue for me it's the the fermentation process that has been going on since 2011 this fragmentation process has not been reverted and it started immediately after the Revolution in 2011 after a National Transitional Council we had the general National Congress after the elections in 2012 the original advance with the in Egypt in 2013 deepen the divide and between the revolutionary forces on one side and counter-revolutionary forces on the other the year later in 2014 the launch of Operation Kurama and fara Libya planned Libya into a second phase of the civil war the fragmentation continued in 2015 with the skillet agreement in Morocco that paved the way to the Libyan Political Agreement the next two years we get the three governments the government of national Accord and its presidency called Council in Tripoli led by fire Saroj the government of national salvation led by caliph al and associated with Congress and the interim government affiliated with the House of Representatives in this and part of the country despite the fact that the genus was readily ejected from from Tripoli in the next two years the presence of the House of Representatives in Tobruk contributed to the regional divide inside Libya between Tripoli Tonia and Cyrenaica in in least these has led to the presence of centrifugal forces in the country and in a shtetl sewer there are centripetal forces the cows inside the country as a breeding ground for malicious groups and terrorist organizations despite the fall of 13 2016 I see a group around the city in Bani Walid in the central part of the of the of the country in the jaffa region and was able to stage sporadic attacks against checkpoints units of the Libyan National Army and likely oil pipeline there are different estimates in the country according to and represents a formidable threat to Libya even though it has maintained a low profile compared to organization represents a serious threat forced the u.s. Africa Command to increase the number of attacks in southern Libya this is just a brief explanation of how the confit is still ongoing and the transition from Gaddafi's Chama area thank you so much so you've mentioned this fragmentation of interests and this large number of militias and this security situation is also being exacerbated by a lack of effective institutions can you just please outline the key threats from these armed groups and militias in effective central government its inability to provide basic services to the population and it's inexistent old on the ground paved the way for the presence of multiple actors and the proliferation of armored groups and militias and represents a return to a local dimension for the political landscape there are different armor groups some of them you can you can see the graphic the most famous are based in Tripoli all of you probably know of the cartel militias that is composed of the absalom brigades the Bobbitt Raja Brigade novice abbreviate special deterrence forces and triple revolutionize Brigade these were involved in the conflict in the battle for Tripoli in August September 2018 despite the fact that most of these clashes occurred there's a turf war so the conflict in August September was a conflict between Insider and I can call outsider militias the inside the militias were are taking advantage of their proximity to the government of national Accord through corrupted practices the war economy the issuance of letters of credit and the black market they were able to appoint their members in the institutions and the outsiders instead were militias that were ejected from Tripoli in different clashes between 2016 and 2017 in eastern part of the country we have the Libyan National Army that despite the name is considered by many observers as another mission is composed of armored groups some of them with a considerable degree of autonomy this fragmentation is also present in the southern part of the country where we have to add also tribes clans and minority groups the recent developments in the southern part show us how the tribal dynamics is an important factor in 2002 from Chad terrorist groups and is a counterterrorism narrative that has also been successful in instrumental in his expansions towards the south great thank you so much and alongside this proliferation of militias we are seeing a number let us know what you expect from introduced to avoid work together with the national mission Libya and try to implement these new security arrangements this replaced the previous security arrangements that didn't work and was cornerstone was the establishment of a new military force that was the presidential guard the presidential guard led by Colin aqua was remain effective and subjugated to a cartel the new security arrangements try to replace irregular militias and armed groups with regular police forces there were several attempts in October through the evacuation of military bases the fact that the genei was able to take control of the Tripoli port they also asked the special talents forced to leave the meeting however the limits of this strategy were shown in the following months after a series of high-profile assassinations in Tripoli and a new outburst of violence in the terrorist attack in December in Tripoli also forced the Philebus a girl mister of interior to paint a bleak picture of the situation he complained about the lack of funds he said there was a chaotic security situation in Tripoli and he also accused militias of being responsible for the clashes and to make a parallel interview ministry inside inside the capital there were other efforts to stabilize the situation in Libya we can mention NATO for example they offer to rebuild the security apparatus in Libya his focus would be on the Minister of Interior defense but NATO's offer overlapped with the Egyptian medicine effort because Egypt was trying to mediate to unify the Libyan army in and from these international efforts by the number of agendas involved it was in May 2007 against Coptic Christians president Abdel Fattah CC or the airstrikes against militants in that was under the control of despite the fact that the attack Amina was claimed by Isis recently an arrest in made by the collaborated Egypt's assumption the terrorists arrested was an Egyptian national his name it was responsible according to Egypt for several attacks against Egyptian targets in Egyptian this attack further a strikes Natalia knew from where the Libyan National Army was losing ground to Islamist militias after the back up shot in massacre in May 2017 at least killed by the 3rd 4th is not a third force and the Benghazi defense relates these airstrikes I love DLNA to regain position in Jaffa and to take control of the Jafra airbase it is interesting to note that the reaction of neighboring countries to these airstrikes because Julia for example put its ground troops on high alert after the Egyptian Iraq this is because Algeria interpreted these attacks as a violation of the Tunis declaration that was signed February 2017 by the Foreign Ministry of Algeria Egypt good I mean it had a good timing because it's an electoral year for Tunisia it's a full argyria and after the recent accusation by after against Algeria last summer this gave after the possibility to take advantage of the Algerians paralysis and to advance to us thank you so the international community has a number of different plans for Libya coming up this year including the National Conference that's supposed to be taking place in the next few weeks as well as the action plan and plans for elections all of these initiatives and this constitution also the Council of state forced the salon had to adopt a flexible approach trying to implement the points this this plan also overlapped with several other initiatives by other countries for example the plan was presented after thank you so much I'm not going to pass over to Emil and ask him to please explain what you think the main regional trends especially those coming out of the Middle East are going to mean for Libya's political future thank you nella and thank you for reminding the audience of my parent's greatest disappointed than me my absence of you know my lack of PhD I make up for it was my great looks but now I apologies when you study Middle East conflicts you have to resort to you know bad humor to you know keep up with with the misery in the region the the point I'm certainly no North Africa or Libya analysts so I look at this in the framework of regional competition and the kind of international involvement that regional competition invites in Libya is a great case because the outcome in Libya is not going to have a fundamental impact on the regional balance of power you know Libya doesn't sit at it's not a a powerful consolidated state that if you somehow capture it or it falls on your side you've you know your original power some somehow explodes it's one of those fights that exists because of legacy involvements that are perpetuated because regional actors at some point invested in certain networks in a certain set of interests and then the fight continues without necessarily being you know really central to those various in/out wellif I this in a second but to those various actors so I would I would argue that in a way that's a tragedy of Libya the the way this this ends it's not gonna it will be hopefully good for the Libyan people hopefully will be good in terms of counterterrorism in terms of management of migration trends etc but it's not going to have a massive impact on the middle-eastern balance of power and in a way this is why it's so puzzling to see so many regional actors so massively invested in it so you can make and we'll make that case and as Umberto mentioned before that it's actually quite important in terms of Egypt for instance it's a direct security issue but when it comes for to the UAE and Qatar for instance which are other Gulf states are massively or we're massively involved in that I think the their level of involvement is very it's very different they are there because the other one is there and the other one won't cave and so first you know Libya is one of the arena's where you know regional involvement is an exacerbating factor one can conceptually like imagine a way where actually original involvement helps to fix the situation but somehow it never really works it there needs to be a development on the battlefield that helps actors reposition themselves the second point I would make about the fighting in Libya is that the fight against Isis or terrorism in general doesn't necessarily have the unifying effect that international actors would like it to believe right I mean this is true in in Syria in Iraq in other places the fact that you're fighting this one big jihadi monster that everyone agrees needs to be defeated doesn't certainly mean that everyone is going to fall in place and prioritize that and in the process you know define down their objectives and the third point here that I would like to make is that the UN UN processes can easily be hijacked or overtaken by battlefield developments or by the ability of one side to just you know get that scored that victory on the battlefield that in a way changes the narratives or force forces the various UN envoy's to adjust to that the reality we saw this in Syria we saw that this we see this in Yemen to some extent and I think Libya is a place where you know there is uncertainty if if after somehow and his forces really managed to drive or get closer to Tripoli you know is um is you know our zombie's efforts really going to be what sets the the global discussion on Libya now to zoom in a bit on on the point about regional competition I mean Libya was in a way one of the key where you know the big divide in the middle is between on one hand Egypt UAE and the other Qatar and Turkey was was unfolding and again yes it was driven by strategic interest by ideology but I would argue that it's also driven by legacy interests that you have invested in a certain set of actors and your interest is to have a return on that involvement you are going to stick by these individuals for as far as much as you can I would argue today that the edge is certainly in favor of the UAE and Egypt in this competition I mean they're the coalition they support one is more coherent and more capable than the opposing coalition it doesn't mean that it is coherent or capable that it's more coherent than the others and and that has an impact in in in how you know policymakers think about it and certainly doesn't help themselves and it's not helped by the coalition that supposedly fights in in support of the UN backed government and this I think that edge is only going to get clearer I think first Egypt by mere virtue of its geographical proximity cannot disengage and and will not disengage and we saw the Egyptians do things you know that we didn't think they would they seemed quite committed they see this the second thing is for the UAE in particular the alignment with France and and Russia is an important one I think they're not out there in the cold they are actually you know there is a political agreement who is too quite powerful actors that happen to sit on the Security Council and can steer the UN discussion on that and at the same time I would argue that interesting you know a country like the UAE has been nimble enough right Suraj shows that if you are if you achieve some success on the battlefield that you're you know smart enough to play play play diplomatically you look good you look like the magnanimous actor and so on and I'm not saying that those meetings necessarily result in substantial but that's quite telling right that they didn't totally ostracize and frost Suraj and say you know you're on the other side we're not gonna engage you actually you you playing it smartly helps and and I would argue that at the same time I'll stop after this at the same time what we've seen is both Turkey and Qatar basically resync part of the regional involvement I mean they are there is a degree of retrenchment both in Doha and Turkey because of setbacks that they have suffered because you know of more important priorities which means that the Turks and the Qataris are certainly not investing in the outcome in Libya today look alternately the thing about Libya is because of the type of war economy that there is because you know the war itself generates enough revenue because of the French and the Italians have been present it's not the rich regional divisions or the regional competition that explains why the conflict lasts so there is a danger in over emphasizing that angle I would argue that in Syria it was in a way the opposite because it was a resource for country because it was surrounded by so many important and very involved governments around it so in Libya it's it's both a curse and possibly a blessing it really depends on the ability of policymakers to to define down their objectives great thank you so much milk so I'm now going to open the floor to questions and answers if you have a question please raise your hand and state your name and affiliation and please wait for the roving mic to come to you we do have a big audience so if I could please ask you all to keep your questions short and concise thank you I haven't heard you mention Italy I'm interested to know what the impact of the Libya crisis is today on refugees flowing to Italy because this was a big problem I've heard from Italian diplomats even for some time ago when I visited Rome and went to the foreign ministry they were saying this is a big problem for us so what is the situation with refugees and Italy and what is the role of Italy in Libya what are they actually doing and secondly I'd like to know what's happening insert has that calmed down as a situation is that a bedrock of Gaddafi rivalry or what's happened to save Gaddafi but what's his role in Libya today yeah I think that the impact of the refugee flows that migrant flows along the central routes played by taken crisis probably in 2016 we had 180 it doesn't rivals from Libya long routes but right now after the externalization policy and criminalization of NGOs last year the arrivals were about 23,000 so the numbers have have decreased and there is probably yeah Italy many interesting they said that the migrant flows energy of course and security and this gives us an idea about how Italy looks to Libya through a security lens everything is based on security there is has been not so much engagement in political resolution of the conflict they only made an attempt in November with the Palermo conference but it was just a reaction to the French initiatives in Paris and also controversial results because it empowered after that is adults with military and was also able to obtain the replacement of the former ambassador the question was about certain and the Qadhafi well its see see see right now there were rebels about the fact that the natural conference could have taken place in Sirte and this was denied because probably to conference to take place in a city where there are supporters at the same time we also didn't discuss about the role of Saif al-islam Gaddafi for example that has recently emerged and has reached out to powerful actors for example Russia and the role of Russia about Libya many says that is just to rely on general Khalifa but we don't have to forget that it's also Russians with the government of national Accord and has also as for me and I was didn't want to omit the open because we wanted to have reassurance about that right now I think the game now is try to do what we did with our Crescent region it means to have control of the office ballot the revenues flow goes directly to the central bank of Libya in Tripoli and not to the central bank every time there is tension in Libya there is always we merge the question of the parallel institutions powerful actors for example the United States probably don't have interest thank you thank you very much and can we take that question over there I'm burr Stanley from Richmond University here in London I'm interested in particular in questions of policing and prisons both formal and informal prisons and in the context of security sector reform they're informal prisons in the South could you comment somewhat about that aspect of security sector reform just quickly on on this you've after and say I mean first I I'm I shouldn't after is a corner of Egypt right like he is a partner of the UAE and others the study of those kinds of relationships suggests that very often the partner ends up disappointing the you know the sponsor in terms of their capability I mean ability to to govern or build a security sector and so on so what's actually interesting is that a number of factors are hedging they're not necessarily giving after the full benefit of the doubt I was just reading some reporting about after a thousand advance and actually it was quite a smart nimble approach where it wasn't necessarily like some large advancing column but it was really co-opting and picking allies on the ground it's largely because you know money was spreading but also because people wanted to believe that there was some kind of order coming so you know those kind of narratives are powerful what I'm trying to get to here is that afters interests don't necessarily fully align with those of his his partners in that sense he needs the regional support he needs the international legitimacy and so on that they bring in terms of international engagement I mean no one is denying including the UN and so on that whatever SAFTA or others they're gonna have the part of a solution I haven't seen you know anyone totally vetoing that this it's a very different situation than you know settlement and in Syria or elsewhere well you know the considerations are very difficult different you know the fact that the French you know gives such a high profile to have the fact that you know otherwise it's a I mean shows that you can't really ignore that the question is whether and going back to what Umberto said is that whether he should be the cornerstone of whatever security or political arrangement comes and if so I mean you know a year ago when he was sick you know that was like you remember there was a number of pieces saying that's it he's exiting the scene the whole thing is going to collapse and then no he wasn't sick or that for that matter he's back he's actually even more ambitious and and more driven than before but perhaps this whole Elleni structure that he has is not as coherent and cohesive right and can it be really the cornerstone of all that in a way it's kind of good if some countries are remain a bit skeptical to actually get you know better conditions a better settlement a full embrace is not going to necessarily help at this point at the same time he's certainly the most powerful of the actors would agree so it would be it's impossible to imagine a political settlement that doesn't give him a prominent role or more prominent than others I think as you mentioned before last year during this period I think it was and he went to Paris and at the time we saw a lot of fishers emerging from DLNA so it's not a cohesive structure as anybody could think about it's called national army but is mainly made by different tribal affiliates and some of them I could easily get at odds with within one of the forces that are a part of the Libyan National Army is the Seca Special Forces and one of the leading commander of the Seca Special Forces general mahmoud abbas ali has also received an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court it was arrested by after but managed to escape from prison so and now we have about only and this is just the front and the side the fact the ground don't like to deal with the same face the same face is the same eight years we didn't go away turning to the south it's going to do because there are so many competing national agendas how will the engagement actually I think that you're right I mean after eight years we have noticed that we have the same players and many of also extended the demanded even beyond limit right now we have municipal elections that could take place in the next months in Libya and this is a good opportunity for a fresh start because renewing municipal council for example could be an apple tree to see new faces and to have an amount of the political or national level everything will be decided I think especially if the ala nice offensive would continue and finally always many times right now I think that at the national level the international international partners let's call it like that have invested so much political capital on these political players to just abandon them on the other question I think that right now in NATO we have as I said before we have the opportunity to engage Libya in reform of its security sector defense ministry interior ministry stata max said that there is no opportunity for a training mission on the ground and as I said before this initiative is overlapping with the Egyptian nation effort and said also to the gentleman in front everything will be decided on the ground because if after gets to Tripoli and if I think that the option of a security reform initiated by Egypt with the cooperation of Egypt will be the most preferable option for the next thank you do we have any more questions all right well in that case I'm going to abuse my position as chair to ask one elections tend to be considered as a sort of marker of a successful transition and they're something that have been trumpeted a lot as a possibility for Libya you mentioned the municipal elections what are the chances of a national election and what kind of I was wondering if you could dig in a little bit more as to what whether or not you think national elections are a realistic possibility and what they might actually bring to Libya is it the transition that would obviously be hopeful or would this be a double-edged sword the one thing I remember is that Libya had several elections 2012 2014 elections in and of themselves you know are certainly not the solution they have to cap a process then just be the you know the beginning or you know elections are often just because they're very visible because you sometimes have a big results they say they tend to be a preference in any one processes and so on but they they often don't necessarily deliver the kind of results that one wants I mean not just elections referendums and others they can actually create a lot more distortion than another it's certainly not the case I mean someone like Hassan Salameh are aware of that that history I'll let Umberto talk about you know how realistic it is politically and operationally to do that you know you need to have a serious serious work upfront to at least agree on what comes in the steps after after an election otherwise if anything you open a new face in the conflict we need money and right now the election commissions in Libya is always complained about the lack of funding from the government of national Accord and the fact that there are also the security conditions are not good there is fighting ongoing in the southern part of the country there is a set of tensions insert there is the threat from the Islamic state that last year also said that it will disrupt the election the elections in Libya and in other countries I think that right now going to elections could be divisive and instead I would prefer to adopt a bottom-up approach as I said the National Conference is a practical solution it could rely on the local dimension that in Libya is really important and has also provided them basic services to the population let's not forget about the tribes they're all that they prayed the council of elders they were an element of stabilizations in Libya compared to what the institution's national institutions okay one more question at the front sir yes sorry Jonathan sure 32 years in the military to your question I'm pretty sure that the special forces that are down there have nothing to do with internal politics because Britain as far as I can see counter view I didn't detect a policy at all and we revert back to to sort of standard frankly sound too like Christopher coca and his recent book about civilization states it's just totally inappropriate to this country and I completely agree next to me he was talking about about half taking over and perhaps that's the best model and you know the questions about DDR and the questions about the security sector reform these are all pretty pie in the sky in relation to this country I'm afraid it's it's so far off the specter that we are I fear applying the wrong analytic tools to to Libya and I'm grateful for the the very honest view that I got from the two presenters today about what a shambles Libya's in and how in fact it's getting worse because there are people who take a much more optimistic view saying you know it's all gonna be fine it isn't gonna be fine and as long as we keep imagining at this place developers we in the West would wish it we are deluding ourselves agree with your question that if he's the big stick that can unite the country and educate stability that's probably a good thing that's not a so-called regime changes thank you for agreeing with us but I'll disagree with you I think there's a danger here which is that you have a mess and suddenly we build in our heads that a military strongman is somehow the response there's no I mean history shows us that regime change whether its internal or externally driven doesn't necessarily work but history also tells us that military strongmen don't have a good record at governance or stabilization for that matter so the danger today is to like fear in the totally different direction it's one thing to say that after has to be part of an agreement but if it comes down to another military strongmen and so no you're just delaying and possibly making the situation much more worse over time we have to consider that that element and and I think it's it's very important it's like at some point we get tired with the fighting we don't know what to do it's all very complex we don't want to do conflict management therefore in our heads and conceptually we decide that there's somehow one individual somewhere can do this right just as you know it was the case of Syria oh okay that's Assad have ruled at all why did we get a jump into that as if those individuals were not involved in creating and fostering the conditions I got there so I'm very worried about this tendency today to embrace the concept of strongmen with you know the military there's a reason why there's healthy civil military relations in this country and others right because you know you may be great on the battlefield operationally and so on but I don't want you to do governance as a civilian and and I don't know that you would you want to do exactly we agree on that one so no but my point is is more profound is that you look at the governance in Egypt and other places yes it looks stable until it's not and then look at at Algeria and you know just next door we've known for five years that you had a presidential election coming and yet that sclerotic system could only find you can only decide to renew your to put back if 85 year old perhaps doesn't can speak back on the ballot box those systems need to be flexible they don't necessarily need to be fully democratic and and and so but they at least have to be responsive and it's very difficult to tell whether this new generation of military commanders and and and would be rulers can show that that magnanimity and that flexibility calculus catechol great thank you do we have any more questions I think we have time for one more so we're gentleman in the middle over there we have one more over here as well as gentleman with the glasses thanks very much Lindy Brogan Royal Marines Royal College of Defense studies I just wondered since the the chaos the divisions in Libya that we won't ever see a unified Libya again and perhaps you might be able to describe a future Libya that might be partitioned in some way winter from The Guardian it's just too small factual questions one is there any possibility that some of the militias in Tripoli may switch sides and join after you've talked a lot about the divisions within the militia and then secondly an earlier event there was some talk about the need for America to fill the vacuum and yet I think as you said this may be no great strategic interest for seen in the pureness is there any evidence America would raise its stake on this issue I think there's a question for the Libyans I mean probably the outcome of the consultation process for the National Conference gave a clear picture Libyans want a united country they don't want to be partitioned despite the fact that there are regional interests ongoing and there is original dynamic ongoing and probably if the division continues the risk is either but the consultations that have been made for the National Conference in the resource gave a majority of Libyans saying that they want a united country the problem right now is probably the fact that as I said before there are nobody keeps noticing that but Libya is in the middle of two powerhouses that are Algeria and Egypt of course Egypt knows that any further push westward from of that was algae's is a risk and probably they also tried it to refrain after from going towards Tripoli there were several rebels saying that also the United States has tried to put stopped to advance towards because there is a risk of generalized conflict re-edition of the 2014 conflict in in the country about the militias yes I mean we have seen that many of the militias which sides they can switch any time it depends on their interests their particular interest and there are of course strong resistance about star especially from Misrata but more recently also the ministry mister of interior saga made an opening towards towards after so despite these conciliatory approaches I think that there will be some resistance in Misrata but at the same time in Tripoli things can change at any time on the u.s. role quickly I mean we've really entered you know as you know the US may be needed or not we may agree on the merits or the wisdom of you know a role and so on I just think that debate in Washington has moved you know far beyond that look I mean just referring to the gentleman's point earlier the debate back in 2011-2012 was whether the US and its you know you're in allies needed to be more engaged in Libya during the transition and and back then the what we heard from Libyans was no no let us own this process you know we'll we'll figure this out to the country a light touch is the better way to go so you have two years during which you have lots of politics you have lots of you know wrangling and so on but you don't have necessarily intense violence and then everything starts collapsing in 2014 and then the debating in Western capitals is like oh perhaps we should have been more involved we should have done more post-conflict planning forgetting that actually a healthy number of Libyans at the time were not in favor of that to the contrary right they they were worried that this would somehow dynamics today it's very difficult to see what the entry point for the US would be I mean you know do they fully embrace the Italian position or the French one or they wait until they see who wins and Tripoli and then they embrace whoever is the winner there I mean first I think was with Trump as president it's very unlikely he wants to disengage from the region altogether despite all the thought now and then and so I think that's his perspective why why be engaged there they it's it's bad for us and but also if you look at the political the political discussion the foreign policy discussion in the u.s. you know the centrist I would say not interventionist I hate that work but those who think that countries like the US could and should do more they're really on the backfoot the democratic party they're not talking about you know the foreign policy progressive agenda is actually about retrenching and doing less and so on so I don't think it's realistic we may talk about whether it's needed that there are ways of doing it and so on but I think that's divorced from the political discussion great thank you I think we'll have to draw it to a close there because we are running low on time but thank you all so much for coming and please join me in thanking excellent [Applause]

Glenn Chapman

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